Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Bridge laws: Bridge laws provide relations between the terms of two theories, if one of the theories is to be reduced to the other. See also reduction, reductionism, theories._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Jerry Fodor on Bridge Laws - Dictionary of Arguments
I 135 Law/natural law/reductionism/connectives/interpretation/Fodor: there is the question of how the connective ">" is to be interpreted (in the reduction of a science to physics). Is it transitive and thus generally accepted? Then there will have to be appropriate bridge laws. Problem: the interpretation of the connective ">" in bridge laws themselves: is reductionism itself therefore a physical thesis? It cannot be equated with "caused", because that is asymmetric. If ">" is in any other relation than identity, then the truth of reductionism will only guarantee the truth of a weak version of physicalism, that it is nomologically necessary that the S and P predicates apply to the same objects (this is the bridge law). This is consistent with a non-physicalist ontology, e.g. that x-™ s fulfillment of S itself is not a physical event. Some authors: bridge laws therefore express contingent event identity (> Token Physicalism)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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> Counter arguments against Fodor
> Counter arguments in relation to Bridge Laws
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28